The impact of consumer monitoring on establishment compliance: The program is highly salient: by the end of 2011, 40 million consumers have asked for receipts more than once, and 13 million people have created online accounts at the tax authority’s website. In order to collect rewards and participate in monthly lotteries consumers need to create an online account at the tax authority’s website, where they can also cross-check receipts reported by establishments and file complaints. As establishments were mandated to report all receipts they issue electronically to the tax authority, this program added the option to insert an individual ID number into each receipt, and created tax rebates for consumers who ask for receipts and who provide their ID numbers to be reported on these receipts. It leverages the new availability of information technology in the developing world, and the fact that consumers in Brazil often provide their ID numbers when shopping. The rewards program from Sao Paulo was introduced in October 2007. I examine how these incentives affect the reported revenue of establishments and consumer participation using a new data set I have constructed from anonymized administrative records of over 1 million establishments, 40 million consumers and 2.7 billion receipts. A concern with such a self-enforcing approach is the possibility of collusion between the consumer and the firm: after all, the reward the government offers is lower than the tax paid by the firm, so the firm could potentially propose a discount for consumers that forgo receipts. I study a program from the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil – Nota Fiscal Paulista (NFP) – that gives tax rebates and lottery tickets for consumers who collect receipts. In order to address this problem, some countries have introduced policies that incentivize consumers to ask for receipts for their purchases. But the supply chain has a “last mile problem:” at the final consumer stage, the VAT’s self-enforcing incentives break down since consumers derive no direct monetary benefit from collecting receipts. For all other links in the supply chain, Value Added Taxes (VAT) create built-in incentives that help ensure compliance in transactions between firms. What’s more, there are typically a large number of small firms that the government needs to monitor. When a consumer makes a purchase, she usually has no incentive to ask for a receipt, which is a key part of the paper trail for enforcement ( Pomeranz, 2013).
I examine firm-level compliance in a particularly challenging context: sales tax on final consumer transactions. In my job market paper (“ Consumers as Tax Auditors ”) I use quasi-experimental evidence to evaluate a program to help governments collect taxes, by incentivizing consumers to monitor firms. Barriers to collecting tax revenue can severely constrain funding for basic public services and investments, and pervasive tax evasion can cause significant distortions in the economy. Tax enforcement is a central public finance issue in developing countries.
#Nota fiscal paulistana series
Thus, a specific new social rental housing policy is proposed to address low income families based on in-kind transfers to achieve efficiency for the existent housing stock in Brazil.This is the sixth in our series of posts by graduates on the job market this year. The study is also based on documents review about affordable social housing and its concepts and Brazilian surveys about their housing stock. The study exhibits some characteristics that could impact affordability of social housing policies in Brazil through questionnaire surveys and interviews related to key factors that could raise living expenditures. For this purpose, the study not only describes the existing social housing policies in Brazil but also reviews and extracts the best lessons of public social rental housing policy around France and South Korea such as land tax incentives for urban developers enhancement of local government participation and alternatives to increase housing funds. The goal of this thesis is to propose policy measures for Brazilian central government to improve the affordability of social housing in this country with focus on a comparative study on the experience from Korea and France.
0 kommentar(er)
